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Abstract 
In this paper, we first construct a dynamic new Keynesian model that incorporates 
life-cycle behavior a la Gertler (1999), in order to study whether structural shocks 
to the economy have asymmetric effects on heterogeneous agents, namely workers 
and retirees. We also examine whether considerations of life-cycle and 
demographic structure alter the dynamic properties of the monetary business cycle 
model, specifically the degree of amplification in impulse responses. According to 
our simulation results, shocks indeed have asymmetric impacts on different 
households and the demographic structure does alter the size of responses against 
shocks by changing the degree of the trade-off between substitution and income 
effects.  
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Societal aging is one of the biggest economic issues facing many developed coun-
tries. In Japan, in particular, society is aging so rapidly that not only is the
working population (those older than 15 but younger than 65) already shrink-
ing, but the total population is also expected to start decreasing by 2007. This
movement suggests that the central bank should have an even greater interest in
how monetary policy aﬀects heterogenous agents, namely workers and retirees,
diﬀerently and how the consideration of this demographic structure may alter
the ampliﬁcation of the variables against structural shocks.1 Seminal research
by Woodford (2003) depicts the various forms of the dynamic New Keynesian
model corresponding to diﬀerent economic conditions and has had a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on central banks’ views of monetary business cycle. However, to date
very little research has paid attention to monetary business cycle model with
heterogenous agents, particularly within a life-cycle setting.2
In this paper, we ﬁrst set up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with nominal rigidities and capital adjustment costs that incorporates life-cycle
behavior al aGertler (1999). Then, we show whether the structural shocks to
the economy have asymmetric eﬀects on heterogeneous agents and whether the
considerations of the life-cycle and demographic structure alter the dynamic
properties of the solution, under diﬀerent settings of life-cycle behavior.3 Of
course, as mentioned in Bean (2004), it is true that “the glacial nature of de-
mographic change appears to suggest that the implications for monetary policy
should be modest.” We, however, believe that it becomes more important for
central banks to acknowledge the asymmetric eﬀects on heterogeneous agents
within a life-cycle economy with a stationary population, since societal aging
in many developing country necessitates the consideration of the distributional
consequences of monetary policy.4 Furthermore, central banks must always
understand the monetary transmission mechanism as well as macroeconomic
responses to structural shocks in detail. Therefore, we focus on the impulse
1For example, “The Coming Demographic Transition: Will We Treat Future Generations
Fairly,” the chairman, Ben Bernanke, discusses the societal ageing and comments that “the
broader perspective shows clearly that adequate preparation for the coming demographic
transition may well involve signiﬁcant adjustments in our patterns of consumption, work
eﬀort and saving,” although the remarks are mainly on the sharing the burden of population
ageing.
2As a large-scale dynamic general equilibrium model used for central bank projections and
policy simulations, Bank of Finland construnts a model with lifecycle behaviour as examined
in this paper (see Kilponen, Ripatti and Vilmunen, 2004).
3This aim is similar to those in recent literature on real rigidities that try to explain realistic
inﬂation persistence with reasonable calibration, such as Sveeen and Weinke (2005), Altig,
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005), and Levin, Lopez-Salido and Yun (2006). Yet,
the demographic structure does not alter the persistence but the volatility of the endogenous
variables against structural shocks.
4Williamson (2005) analyzes monetary policy and resulting distribution in an island econ-
omy. Furthermore, Doepke and Schneider (2005) shows that young borrowers beneﬁtm o r e
from inﬂation than retirees, and inﬂation can be welfare-enhancing since it acts like a tax on
foreign share holders. Their analyses are, however, not based on the canonical dynamic new
Keynesian model, heavily used among central banks.
2responses of this life-cycle economy. We know that the impact of societal aging
on general equilibrium has two separate aspects, and it is important to distin-
guish between the two. First, the “transition” toward the aging society can be
most naturally considered in terms of a macro shock, which will aﬀect mone-
tary policy decisions. Second, the impulse responses derived from a dynamic
new Keynesian model in a “stationary population” may be quite diﬀerent for an
elderly society than for a young society. For the purposes of the current paper,
we focus on the second of these two aspects.
Bean (2004) summarizes the previous ﬁndings in this ﬁeld, pointing out
their implications for a central bank: (1) demographic developments represent
a macroeconomic shock, which may lead to abrupt movements in asset prices
and sharp movements in saving behavior; (2) the natural rate of interest falls
both along the transition path and in the steady state; (3) the natural rate of
unemployment may also be aﬀected through the matching mechanism;5 (4) the
wealth channel is likely to become a more important transmission channel of
monetary policy than intertemporal substitution; (5) the Phillips curve is ﬂat-
ter due to immigration and the increased participation of retired workers whose
supply of labor is considered to be relatively elastic; (6) the constituency for
keeping inﬂation low will be larger thanks to higher average wealth accumula-
tion; and (7) societal aging may induce diversiﬁcation and risk-shifting with a
securitized market rather than bank-intermediated ﬁnance, which has implica-
tions for ﬁnancial stability. Although not all the topics raised by Bean (2004) can
be covered in this paper, we formally verify (4) using the dynamic general equi-
librium model with sticky price and life-cycle behavior. Yet, as societal aging
deepens, although income eﬀect becomes stronger for retirees, that of workers
becomes weaker. Hence, in aggregate, a tightening monetary policy shock still
has negative impacts on the aggregate demand. Even though consumption of
retirees increase, worker’s consumption or the investment need to be lowered
since there is no expansion in the production frontier. At the same time, we will
show that (2) is not a general result due to the endogenized labor participation
by retirees. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that since retirees do not work as much as
workers, they beneﬁt less from improved technology, a point not by raised by
Bean (2004). Therefore, the monetary response to a positive technology shock
can be smaller in a greyer society. Anecdotal evidence on these points has
abounded, but there have been very few studies that have tackled this problem
in a theoretically consistent dynamic general equilibrium framework,6 which is
the workhorse model for modern monetary policy analysis. Our main conclu-
sions are as follows. Since retired people rely more on interest income than on
wages from their labor supply, shocks indeed have diﬀerent impacts on diﬀerent
households. Furthermore, the demographic structure does alter the size of the
response to shocks by changing the degree of the trade-oﬀ between substitution
and income eﬀects. Therefore, societal aging and life-cycle considerations, have
5We would like to consider incorporating matching mechanism similar to Merz (1995) and
Andolfatto (1996) in our future research.
6Miles (2002) is one exception, but not based on the canonical dynamic new Keynesian
model.
3important implications for monetary policy.
Another interesting point is to compare optimal monetary policy in this
life-cycle economy to the one obtained in a standard model with homogeneous
agents. Stochastic welfare analysis, however, raises diﬃcult issues such as what
discount rate should be used by ﬁrms, how we should distribute initial proﬁt
stemming at the time when the shock hits the economy among diﬀerent agents,
and which welfare measures are appropriate with the setting of the model in
this paper. As for last point, it is not trivial to compute aggregate welfare with
heterogenous agents. In other words, it is diﬃcult to weigh the welfare of each
heterogenous agent in order to obtain aggregate welfare measure. Similarly, to
determine the weights when distributing the initial proﬁt between workers and
retirees is not a trivial task either.7 The ﬁrst is an especially large concern with
incomplete markets and heterogenous agents, because marginal utility growth
rates are no longer equalized across agents and therefore the choice of the ap-
propriate discount factor is no longer obvious.8 Thus, we restrict our analysis
to the case of perfect foresight with one-time unanticipated shocks that may be
auto-correlated as examined in Ghironi (2006), Kilponen and Ripatti (2006),
and Kilponen, Kinnunen, and Ripatti (2006). In a perfect-foresight setting, all
assets including the one-period bond must yield the same return. As a result
some very diﬃcult (and as yet unsolved) problems regarding asset valuation can
be side stepped.
This paper is put together as follows. In section two, we describe the model
employed in this analysis. Then, section three discusses the nature of our sta-
tionary population under diﬀerent demographic structures. We show that the
natural rate of interest is quite diﬀerent among the diﬀerent demographic setups.
In section four, we show the impulse responses and show that shocks indeed have
diﬀerent impacts on diﬀerent households and the demographic structure does
alter the size of responses against shocks by changing the degree of the trade-oﬀ
between substitution and income eﬀects. Finally, section ﬁve concludes.
2M o d e l
The model examined here is based on Gertler (1999). We add a sticky price
mechanism with endogenous capital whose accumulation is subject to an in-
vestment adjustment cost. This type of the model has been referred to as the
“canonical model” by Edge (2003). We have six agents in this model, namely
7When we solve the dynamic general equilibrium model with solved-out consumption func-
tion as in this paper, we need to determine the initial proﬁt stemming from an unexpected
change in the rate of return at the period when the shock hits the economy. This will not
be any problem when agents are homogeneous, but will become an issue when heterogeneous
agents are considered. Hence, as you will see later, the impulse responses of non-aggregated
variables (consumption, labor supply and welfare of workers and retirees) at the initial period
is explained by the allocation rule rather than economic dynamics.
8One solution is to use a discount factor that is a weighted average of the marginal utility
of wealth of each group of agents with the group weights given by the relative share holdings
as examined in Heathcote and Perri (2004) for foreign and domestic shareholders.
4ﬁrms, capital producers, ﬁnancial intermediaries, households, a government,
and the central bank. As explained above, we limit our analysis to the cases
with perfect foresight to avoid aggregation issues stemming from heterogeneous
agents.
2.1 Firms
Firms face a cost minimization problem via price setting subject to a Rotemberg
(1982) - type adjustment cost.
2.1.1 Marginal Cost
Marginal cost, where there exist two inputs, namely labor L and capital K,i s
computed as in Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). By denoting real
wages by W





subject to the standard Cobb-Douglas production technology with capital share
being α,
Yj,t =[ Zt exp(zt)Lj,t]
1−α Kα
j,t, (1)
where Y is output, Z is deterministic technology growth, and z is a temporary
technology shock. The Lagrangian multiplier of this optimization problem is the












where π i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation. Similarly, real wages and the cost of capital are
also deﬁned as follows:
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Under monopolistic competition and a Rotemberg-type adjustment cost φ,e a c h




















5τ denotes a tax subsidy which is levied on households in lump-sum manner9 and
is assumed to eliminate the distortion in the stationary population stemming





In a symmetric equilibrium where Pj,t = Pt and the target level of inﬂation is
zero, the ﬁrst order necessary condition implies
κ(ϕt − 1) − φ(πt − 1)πt +
m0,t+1
m0,t
φ(πt+1 − 1)πt+1 =0 , (5)





m denotes the stochastic discount factor that is used to discount proﬁts over
time. Formally, it is determined as the weighted marginal utilities of the share
















where β is the subjective discount factor, ww is the weight on the workers’
marginal utility, which is, for example, assumed to be given by the relative share
holdings in Heathcote and Perri (2004), V and C denote recursive utility and
consumption respectively. The superscript w describes a variable that applies
to workers, while r stands for retirees. We do not face the usual complication
in aggregation stemming from heterogeneous agents, since we limit our analysis
to the linearized model with the one-period bond around stationary population
under perfect foresight. The link between this pricing kernel and the risk-free
rate is given in the subsection below.
2.2 Capital Producers
Capital producers, who maximize proﬁts under a perfectly competitive market,
enter the current period t with Kt units of capital. This is the amount of
capital they can rent to ﬁnal goods producers in the current period and receive
a (nominal) factor payment of PtrK
t Kt. Furthermore, these capital-producing
ﬁrms have borrowed from ﬁnancial intermediary in this period. The nominal
value of these funds is At,s i n c eAt is total nominal funds invested by the
ﬁnancial intermediary in period t.T h eﬁrm pays a gross nominal interest rate
RK
t on these funds. The ﬁrm also undertakes new investment, PtIt, and borrows
9In this model, since households are heterogeneous, the size of the lump sum tax to each
agent is determined by the population ratio between workers and retirees. As a result, the
same lump sum tax is levied on each agent.













Firms maximize these proﬁts using the appropriate asset pricing kernel, subject
to the production technology of capital used by ﬁrms:


































where S00 determines the size of this adjustment cost, and is the second deriv-
ative of this adjustment cost function with respect to It/It−1.F r o mﬁrst order


















































Our model also includes ﬁnancial intermediaries that give funds to the capital
producers and holds equity of the ﬁnal goods producers and the capital pro-
ducers. Households can put their money into this ﬁnancial intermediary and
receive a return that is composed of the returns on equities and the funds that
are given to the capital producers. Financial intermediaries maximize their real
10As shown in Dupor (2001), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) and Woodford (2003), realistic
empirical properties of this sort of the model, especially in responses to a policy shock, are













































where x is the share of the equity, and P is the price of such assets, where
superscript F denotes those of ﬁnal goods ﬁrms while K denotes those of capital

































w h e r ew ed e ﬁne E as the real amount of equity holdings.12 S i n c ew eo n l y
conduct perfect foresight simulations in this paper, all assets produce the same





















The government simply collects a lump-sum tax to subsidize ﬁrms in order to
eliminate the distortion caused by monopolistic competition. We assume that
each agent faces the same level of the lump sum tax T. Therefore, the budget
constraint which the government faces is simply:
1
κ − 1
Yt =( Nt + Nr
t )Tt, (14)
where N denotes the population of workers while Nr is that of retirees.
11Since these arbitrage conditions hold only in the absence of the unexpected shocks, these
do not apply on the initial date when the shock hits the economy. Therefore, we distribute
the initial proﬁts from ﬁnancial intermediaries between diﬀerent agents according to their
amounts of ﬁnancial assets holdings in period zero, namely in the stationary population.
12This equals to the relative price of equities since the share is unity in aggregate.
82.5 Households
In the life-cycle economy assumed in this model, there are two types of house-
holds: retirees and workers.
2.5.1 Retiree
Retirees, denoted by superscript r, who were born at j and become retired at k,






















where ρ determines the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ν deﬁnes
the marginal rate of transformation between consumption and leisure. Since
rate of survival of retirees, speciﬁcally his probability of surviving until the next
period, is assumed to be γ, future welfare is discounted by common subjective























where FA is the amount of their ﬁnancial asset holding and ξ ∈ [0,1] is the
relative marginal product of labor of the retirees to workers. It is natural to
assume that retirees receive less compensation than workers.15 The real rate
of return is now Rt
γ since bequests are distributed among retirees by the life
insurance company in a perfectly competitive market.16 From the ﬁrst order





























13The functional form is quite similar to the one in Lucas and Stokey (1984), and Epstein
and Zin (1989).
14A Cobb-Douglas utility function satisﬁes the balanced growth restriction.
15There are other interpretations for ξ. It can be considered to reﬂect the incentive and
legal structure, pension system, the relative labor income tax rate, or the custom taken by
ﬁrms to reduce the total personnel expenses.
16In this paper, insurance is perfect within generations, but transitional risk from a worker
to a retiree is uninsurable. For details, see Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965).
9From these equations, we derive the consumption function, in the form of total



















By iterating the budget constraint forward, human wealth H can be expressed














Similarly, the present discounted value of lump sum taxes PT,i se x p r e s s e da s :
PT
rjk






















































































where ω is the probability that the current worker will remain a worker in
the next period. From the ﬁrst order necessary conditions, we can derive the
































































































































As with the case for retirees, we are looking to identify the marginal propensity

















By using the consumption Euler equation and the consumption function, we































































































w h e r ew ed e ﬁne

















































































If these equations are satisﬁed, the surmised value function has a solution.
2.5.3 No Life-Cycle Benchmark
As a test-case for our model, we ﬁr s te x a m i n et h ec a s ew h e r eω =1 .W i t h
this assumption, workers live forever, and so we delete the life-cycle aspects of
the model. Since this assumption does not aﬀect the behavior in other sectors,
we show just the households’ choice problem. The equilibrium condition for





















Lt − Ct − Tt.
2.6 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor type instrument rule as in Taylor
(1993):










where RSS is the short-term nominal interest rate in stationary population,
Y F is the output in the ﬂexible price equilibrium, computed simultaneously by
assuming the absence of nominal rigidities. Since all variables are in quarterly
terms, the coeﬃcient on the output gap is divided by four. As is obvious from
the setting of a Rotemberg-type adjustment cost and this equation, the target
level of inﬂation is set to zero.
2.7 Aggregation
In this subsection, we ﬁrst summarize the population growth in this model.
Then, we transform equations that deﬁne individual behavior into aggregate
form.
122.7.1 Population Growth
The dynamics of the population of workers are expressed as follows:
Nt+1 =( 1 − ω + n)Nt + ωNt
=( 1 + n)Nt,
where n is the growth rate of workers, while that of retirees is:
Nr
t+1 =( 1− ω)Nt + γNr
t .
Hence, assuming a stationary population, the ratio of the number of retirees to







which means that both the working and retired populations grow at the same
rate n.
2.7.2 Aggregation
If we assume the existence of a non-proﬁt life insurance company that distributes
wealth among retirees, the marginal propensity to consume is equated across all
retirees. Therefore, subscripts j and k in most equations above can be removed.
Below, we show the aggregate equilibrium conditions. The law of motion of






































where we express the expenses stemming from the lump sum tax by using equa-
tions (14) and (25). Next, we aggregate individual labor supply. This simply
involves multiplying by the population of each category:
Lr
















Furthermore, because the population growth rate in each category is (1 + n),


































































Finally, applying the market clearing conditions, the ﬁnancial market equilib-
rium is
FA w

















t + It. (35)
2.7.4 System of Equations
The system of equations consists of structural equations:17 (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
(6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (16), (17), (18), (19), (21), (22), (23), (24),
(26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), (33), (34), (35), and their counterparts in a
ﬂexible equilibrium, that are computed by excluding nominal rigidity and there-
fore equation (24). Since we assume both deterministic technology and popu-
lation growth, endogenous variables are de-trended: C,D,F,H,I,K,PT,Y,ΠK
are de-trended by ZN; A and FA is de-trended by ZNP; W is de-trended by
ZP; L is de-trended by N;a n dV is by ZvN.
3 Properties under Stationary Population
Parameters in the baseline life-cycle economy are depicted in Table 1. Since the
model is solved with quarterly frequency, parameters are on quarterly terms.
17Some are derived before assuming the symmetry of agents and aggregation.
14Table 1
Parameter values
Parameter Value Description and Deﬁnitions
θ 5 θ/(θ − 1) is markup
σ .25 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
φ 60 Price adjustment cost
β 1.04−.25 Subjective discount factor
ω 1.023−.25 Probability of remaining as worker
α 0.667 Labor share
δ 1.12.5 − 1 Capital depreciation rate
ρ −3( σ − 1)/σ
ν .4 Utility weight on consumption
ξ .6 Labor productivity of retirees
γ 1.1−.25 Probability of remaining as retirees
S00 2.48 Second derivative of adjustment cost
Z 1.010.25 − 1 Technology growth rate
n 1.010.25 − 1 Population growth rate
Γ 0.21 Stationary population ratio of retirees over workers
ρz 0.8 Technology shock persistence
In our baseline life-cycle economy, we assume that people work from age 21
to 65, which is deﬁned by ω, while people remain in retirement from age 66 to 75,
deﬁned by γ, based on Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). Other parameters which
deﬁne life-cycle behavior are exactly the same as those in Gertler (1999) except
for newly added parameters, namely θ, φ,a n dS”. Elasticity of substitution
among goods θ is set at the conventional value as calibrated in Smets and
Wouters (2003), or Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005). The size
of the Rotemberg-type adjustment cost φ is also set at the conventional value
so that on average one-forth of ﬁr m sc h a n g ep r i c e si ne a c hp e r i o di nal i n e a r l y
observational equivalent speciﬁcation al aCalvo (1983). The size of capital
adjustment cost, S” is taken from the estimated value in Christiano Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005).
3.1 Values under Stationary Population
In this subsection, we study the long-run eﬀects of diﬀerent demographic struc-
tures. For this purpose, three versions of a stationary population are computed:
(i) the base line life-cycle economy is a younger economy (low γ), (ii) an older
economy (high γ), and (iii) no life-cycle economy. Concerning demographic dif-
ferences, individuals’ life expectancy becomes longer in (ii) older economy. In
this economy, individuals retire at the age of 65 but are supposed to live until
85. To achieve this, the parameter that determines the probability of remaining
as retirees, γ,i sa l t e r e df r o m1.1−.25 to 1.05−.25. As a result of this alteration,
the percentage of workers to retirees Γ changes from 21% to 39%. In (iii) no life-
cycle economy, all households are symmetric, since they live inﬁnitely long. An
15interpretation of this setting is that households can completely insure their risk
of transition from workers and retirees, and are so altruistic that they consider
the welfare of their descendents in their utility functions. Table 2 shows the val-
ues of major endogenous variables in (i) younger economy, (ii) older economy
and (iii) no life-cycle economy.
Table 2
Values under Stationary Population
c/y k/y R ar/k θ ²θ lw lr
(i) .70 10.3 .01 .16 .017 .03 .41 .05
(ii) .70 10.3 .01 .22 .014 .02 .41 .12
(iii) .76 8.2 .02 − .013∗ − .37∗ −
* shows the variables of the representative agent in (iii).
First, we contrast the results in a model with heterogenous agents in incom-
plete market setup with homogenous agents in complete market. In the former,
workers need to prepare for the future period in which they become retirees be-
cause their labor productivity is lower than that of workers. Their incentive to
save tends to become higher in this economy. These movements should result in
higher capital-output ratio, and therefore, real interest rates should be lower in
(ii) older economy so that we can derive the usual results of a life-cycle model,
namely dynamic ineﬃciency due to too much saving.18
As it turns out, comparing diﬀerent life-cycle economies is somewhat counter-
intuitive. With the same reasoning as above, it seems natural that the capital-
output ratio is higher and real interest rates are lower in (ii) older economy than
(i) younger economy. The results in Table 2, however, show the opposite albeit
slightly. The capital output ratio is 10.2684 in (i) and 10.2677 in (ii) while real
interest rates are 0.008478 in (i) and 0.008480 in (ii). Yet, this is not a puzzle at
all, if we understand the labor supply of the retirees. The longer life expectancy
in retirees induces two diﬀerent eﬀects, namely the tension between worker’s
marginal disutility for further saving and the retiree’s marginal disutility for
further reduction in leisure. As explained above, workers try to save more to
prepare for longer retirement period. On the other hand, retirees need to work
more even though their labor productivity is lower to maintain an optimized
level of consumption. If the former dominates, real interest rates fall even
in the economy where retirees have longer life expectancy. In this example,
the latter dominates the former. Labor supply of retirees rises so much that
workers accumulate less capital in (ii). This result that younger people save less
in a economy where retiree’s life expectancy is longer does, however, not hold
generally. Under some parameter settings, real interest rates indeed become
18Comparison of marginal propsensity to consume and labor supply between life-cycle
economies and no life-cycle economy is not trivial since we need to compute average mar-















Labor supply by retirees (left)
Real interest rate (right)
years
Figure 1: Long-run eﬀects of average life expectancy
lower in a greyer society, which is consistent with the conventional wisdom as
the second point raised by Bean (2004) in introduction. Thus, it is of great
importance for a central bank to take demographic structure into account, since
the natural rate of interest should be quite diﬀerent across diﬀerent demographic
settings. We will check the sensitivity of our results in long-run properties model
in the next subsection. Concerning the marginal propensity to consume, those
of both workers and retirees decrease in (ii) because life expectancy increases.
3.2 Long-Run Properties under Alternative Demographic
Structure
We next explore how the above results change when we assume alternative de-
mographic structures by altering fundamental structural parameters, γ,a n dξ.
Figure 1 shows the transition of the retiree’s labor supply and real interest rates
by altering γ from 1.2−0.25 to 1.025−0.25. Accordingly, the horizontal axis shows
the average retirement years. Furthermore, values in shaded region coincide with
those in (i) younger economy. As explained in the above subsection, the labor
supply of retirees increases, as life expectancy grows. The relationship between
the worker’s saving and life expectancy is, however, not monotonic. While the
average length of retirement is below 10 years, real interest rates fall, as con-
sistent with conventional views. On the other hand, the length becomes longer
than 10 years, real interest rates rise due to much higher labor participation by
retirees.
How does the relative labor productivity of retirees to workers change due to
movements in the stationary population? To answer this question, we compute
the stationary population for ξ being 0.4 to 1.0 as shown in Figure 2. As the
labor productivity becomes higher, retirees tend to work longer since they can
receive more compensation per unit of labor supply. Furthermore, this implies
that workers become less worried about becoming retirees and less productive.
Hence, they consume more and save less. This results in higher real interest
rates as the relative productivity of workers increases. Another intriguing result












Figure 2: Long-run eﬀects of labor productivity of retirees
workers, even though there is no diﬀerence in labor productivity between workers
and retirees, namely the economy is at the far right in the horizontal axis.
In this situation, the only intrinsic diﬀerence between workers and retirees is
the subjective discount factor. The fact that retirees have a lower subjective
discount factor makes the marginal propensity to consume higher for retirees
than for workers. Therefore, even if the labor productivity is the same across
workers and retirees, retirees choose to consume more and to have additional
leisure than increase labor supply.
We will check how above diﬀerent demographic structures may alter the
dynamic properties, namely the degree of ampliﬁcation of impulse responses in
the next section.
4D y n a m i c P r o p e r t i e s
In this section, we answer the two major questions raised in this paper, namely
whether the structural shocks to the economy have asymmetric eﬀects on work-
ers and retirees and whether the considerations of life-cycle and demographic
structure alter the dynamic properties of the solution. For this aim, we ﬁrst
analyze the impulse responses to a level technology shock. Then, we investigate
the transmission mechanism of a monetary policy shock. The reason why we
choose these two shocks is that a technology shock can possibly have asymmet-
ric eﬀects on workers and retirees through the diﬀerence in labor productivity,
while a positive shock on nominal interest rates may enhance the welfare of
retirees since they rely more on ﬁnancial assets.
4.1 Technology Shock
In this subsection, we study the impulse responses to a positive technology
shock. First, we show impulse responses in (iii) no life-cycle economy as a
benchmark.19 Then, we compare these benchmark responses with those ob-
19This is because the model in this paper diﬀers from the standard model in utility speci-
ﬁcation. There have been very few researches on the new Keynesian model with a recursive
18Investment Real Wage Consumption Labor Supply
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Figure 3: Responses to a technology shock in no life-cycle economy
tained in (i) younger economy and (ii) older economy. Finally, we demonstrate
the shifts in impulse responses as the life expectancy of retirees becomes longer
and their relative productivity becomes higher.
4.1.1 Benchmark: No Life-Cycle Economy
The thick black lines in Figure 3 show the impulse responses to a shock to the
level of technology in (iii) no life-cycle economy. Although the model is based on
exotic preference, responses are similar to those obtained in standard dynamic
new Keynesian model with capital. A shock to the level of technology naturally
increases the level of output, consumption and investment. Since the investment
adjustment cost is embedded in the model, the response of investment is hump
shaped. At the same time, however, deﬂation occurs, and therefore the nominal
interest rate falls. Unlike the technology shock usually employed in a dynamic
new Keynesian model without capital, explained in Walsh (2003) and Woodford
(2003), the shock assumed in this model is a level shock. Since the shock decays
gradually, it is recognized as a negative growth shock in the Euler equations of
a log linearized system, where the percentage deviation of current consumption
from its stationary population value receives positive eﬀects from growth shock
of technology. Therefore, even though GDP increases, the inﬂation rate and
nominal interest rates are decreased.
Furthermore, as emphasized in Gali (1999) and Gali and Rabanal (2004),
a shock to the level of technology reduces the labor supply due to the sticky
price mechanism embedded in this model. Since monetary policy does not fully
oﬀset the distortion caused by varying the markup, the ability for a full in-
crease in output reﬂecting the shock which expands the production frontier is
limited. Therefore, a technology shock reduces labor supply in this model. The
utility.
19response of the real wage seems somewhat puzzling. The real wage decreases
after a positive technology shock. This, however, is not puzzling at all. In a
baseline case, after a level technology shock hits the economy, the existence of
the Rotemberg-type price adjustment cost makes ﬁnal goods’ producers increase
the markup and therefore, lower the marginal cost. The eﬀect of the lowered
marginal cost dominates the increase in technology itself. Therefore, as the la-
bor demand curve shifts in, the real wage is reduced right after a shock hits the
economy. Thin dotted lines show the responses when the Rotemberg-type price
adjustment cost φ is reduced by one-ﬁf t ho ft h a ti nt h eb a s e l i n ec a s e . 20 In this
case, lowered price adjustment cost makes the markup less variable. Hence, a
positive technology shock raises the real wage immediately. As consistent with
theory, both labor supply and the real wage increase when the price is ﬂexible
as depicted by thin solid lines. Whether real wage decreases after the posi-
tive technology shock depends also on the investment adjustment cost. When
monetary policy cannot fully accommodate shocks to technology, ﬁrms react by
reducing their inputs mainly via labor demand since they face an investment
adjustment cost. Thus, the leftward shift of the labor demand becomes more
signiﬁcant when the investment adjustment cost is higher.21
4.1.2 Societal Aging Eﬀects
Here, we compare the responses in two life-cycle economies so that we can
understand how the societal aging inﬂuences the time-properties of the economy.
Then, we further investigate how shocks can have asymmetric eﬀects on workers
and retirees, respectively.
Figure 4 shows the responses to a technology shock in life-cycle economies.
The thin lines demonstrate those in (i) younger economy and dotted lines show
those in (ii) older economy. Overall, responses in life-cycle economies are sim-
ilar to those obtained in the economy with homogeneous agents. There are,
however, a few intriguing diﬀerences. First, a level technology shock has quite
diﬀerent eﬀects on workers and retirees and hence, there could exist a welfare
trade-oﬀ between workers and retirees when stabilizing the economy. Second,
consumption in retirees shows much more of an increase in (ii) older economy.
As a result, responses in (ii) older economy become more similar to those in (iii)
no life-cycle economy.
On the ﬁrst point, the responses of workers are both quantitatively and qual-
itatively quite diﬀerent from those of retirees. For example, both responses of
consumption and labor supply are much smaller especially in (i) younger econ-
omy, while consumption of workers increase right after a positive technology
shock,22 that of retirees is almost unchanged except for the initial period due
20As a result, 50% of ﬁrms can change prices in each period.
21This implies that introduction of habit persistence or labor adjustment cost will alter
responses as shown in Vigfusson (2004). Furthermore, if sticky wage al aErceg, Henderson
and Levin (2000) is included, we will not see an immediate decrease in real wage.
22Initial decrease is due to the decrease in labor supply and real wage that are explained in
the previous subsection.
20Labor Supply (Workers) Consumption (Retirees) Labor Supply (Retirees) Consumption (Workers)
Welfare (Workers) Welfare (Retirees) Investment Real Wage
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Figure 4: Responses to a technology shock in life-cycle economies
to the theoretically consistent distribution of initial proﬁts.23 Since retirees are
less productive than workers, their labor supply is much smaller than those of
workers, as shown in the previous section. Therefore, the gain from higher tech-
nology aﬀects workers more than retirees. Consequently, the welfare, namely the
recursive utility, of workers rises after a positive technology shock, but that of
retirees is lowered since they need to work more even though their productivity
is low.
Concerning the second point, comparing the responses between in (i) younger
economy and in (ii) older economy leads us to notice that diﬀerences between
workers and retirees become smaller in (ii) older life-cycle economy. As shown
in previous section, in (i) older economy, retirees need to increase their labor
supply to maintain optimal level of consumption. Thus, as life expectancy
grows, retirees work more and therefore, retirees can enjoy the beneﬁto fh i g h e r
technology as much as workers can. Consequently, responses in (ii) older life-
cycle economy becomes more similar to those in (iii) no life-cycle economy.
23As has been mentioned, how to distribute the initial proﬁta tt h et i m ew h e nt h es h o c k
hits the economy determines the responses at the ﬁrst period. In this simulation, a positive
technology shock increases the initial proﬁt, part of which is distributed to retirees as well.
This results in an initial increase of retiree’s consumption. As you will see later, the opposite
happens with the monetary policy shock.
21Consumption (Retirees) Labor Supply (Workers)
Welfare (Workers) Welfare (Retirees) Real Wage
Marginal Cost
Labor Supply (Retirees)
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Figure 5: Responses to a technology shock as retiree’s life expectancy becomes
longer
4.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Here, we show how diﬀerent demographic setups aﬀect the responses to a tech-
nology shock.
Life Expectancy of Retirees Figure 5 shows the shifts in impulse responses
to a level technology shock, as the life expectancy of retirees becomes longer.
The thicker the line becomes, the longer the life expectancy of the retirees be-
come. There, 2.5y means that average life-expectancy of retirees is 2.5 years.
With shorter life expectancy, retirees rely more on income from returns on ﬁ-
nancial assets. Therefore, retirees do not alter consumption as well as leisure
signiﬁcantly. Reﬂecting these developments in retirees, workers can receive most
of the beneﬁts from higher technology. Since they do not have to prepare seri-
ously for the life after retirement, they save (invest) less and therefore can enjoy
huge welfare gain. On the other hand, the responses of aggregate output and
the inﬂation rate become much larger as the retirees’ labor supply in stationary
population increase due to longer life expectancy as shown in Figure 1.
Productivity of Retirees Figure 6 shows the responses as the relative labor
productivity of retirees to workers changes. This time, the thicker the line
becomes, the more productive the retirees become. Since there are no signiﬁcant
shifts in values in the stationary population as seen in Figure 2, diﬀerent settings
22Consumption (Retirees) Labor Supply (Workers)
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Figure 6: Responses to a technology shock as retiree’s labor productivity be-
comes higher
only result in minor diﬀerences for most variables. Yet, as the retirees become
more productive, the diﬀerence between workers and retirees becomes smaller.
4 . 2 M o n e t a r yP o l i c yS h o c k
In this subsection, we study the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock.
First, we show the impulse responses in (iii) no life-cycle economy as a bench-
mark. Then, we compare this benchmark responses with those obtained in
(i) younger economy and (ii) older economy. Finally, we demonstrate shifts in
impulse responses as the life expectancy of retirees becomes longer and their
relative productivity becomes higher.
4.2.1 Benchmark: No Life-Cycle Economy
The impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in (iii) no life-cycle economy
are shown in Figure 7. In this paper, we assume that the monetary policy shock
is not serially correlated. A tightening shock reduces investment, consumption,
and output via higher real interest rates. The decrease in output necessitates
the reduction on inputs. Therefore, the real wage and eventually the marginal
cost also fall. Consequently, we see a deﬂation after a positive shock to nominal
interest rates.
23Nominal Interest Rate Output Inflation Rate Marginal Cost
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Figure 7: Responses to a monetary policy shock in no life-cycle economy
4.2.2 Societal Aging Eﬀects
Figure 8 below compares the responses to a monetary policy shock in two life-
cycle economies. As in Figure 4, the thin lines demonstrate those of (i) younger
economy and dotted lines show those of (ii) older economy. Similarly to the
case with a positive technology shock, responses of retirees are quite diﬀerent
from those of workers. Since retirees rely more on ﬁnancial assets accumulated
when they were workers, they mostly increase their consumption and leisure
after a positive monetary tightening shock. In other words, income eﬀects from
increase in nominal interest rates dominates substitution eﬀects for retirees. As
a result, the welfare of workers falls signiﬁcantly while that of retirees mostly
increase. This implies that a central bank may face a severe policy trade-oﬀ:I f
the central bank cares more about retirees, or if monetary policy is determined
mainly through opinions of older people because of their bargaining power in
politics over younger people, there may be a bias towards higher nominal interest
rates.24
Again, in (ii) older economy, diﬀerences between workers and retirees become
smaller. Due to higher labor supply to maintain optimal level of consumption
by retirees, they become more similar to workers. As a result, a tightening
monetary policy shock has much larger negative eﬀects on the macroeconomy
as a whole. Below, we will see how the eﬀectiveness of a surprise in monetary
policy can change as the demographic structure is altered.
24A stochastic welfare analysis is thus very interesting. The aggregation problem for the
appropriate pricing kernel makes stochastic analysis not very trivial. This is left for our future
research.
24Labor Supply (Retirees) Consumption (Workers)
Welfare (Workers) Welfare (Retirees) Investment Real Wage
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Figure 8: Responses to a monetary policy shock in life-cycle economies
4.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We here demonstrate how the life expectancy and productivity of retirees may
change the responses to a monetary policy shock.
Life Expectancy of Retirees Figure 10 demonstrates the responses to a
monetary policy shock when the life expectancy of retirees becomes longer. As
shown in Figure 1, labor supply of retirees is the smallest when the average
life expectancy of retirees is only 2.5 years. In this case, since retirees hardly
rely on their labor income but instead on the returns from ﬁnancial assets, the
consumption of retirees mostly increases while labor supply is even reduced. Yet,
as societal aging deepens, although income eﬀect becomes stronger for retirees,
that of workers becomes weaker. Hence, in aggregate, a tightening monetary
policy shock still has negative impacts on the aggregate demand. Even though
consumption of retirees increase, worker’s consumption or the investment need
to be lowered since there is no expansion of the production frontier.
Productivity of Retirees Figure 9 below demonstrates the responses with
changing labor productivity of retirees. With lower relative productivity of
retirees, their labor supply in stationary population is very small as show in
Figure 2. Therefore, consumption of retirees mostly increases due to an in-
crease in nominal interest rates. A positive shock on nominal interest rates
increases the income from ﬁnancial assets holdings for retirees, so they reduce
25Inflation Rate
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Figure 9: Responses to a monetary policy shock as retiree’s life expectancy
becomes longer
Consumption (Retirees) Labor Supply (Workers)
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Figure 10: Responses to a monetary policy shock as retiree’s labor productivity
becomes higher
26labor supply. As a result of higher consumption and lower labor supply, retiree’s
welfare improves the most when the labor supply of retirees is the lowest.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we construct a dynamic new Keynesian life-cycle model based on
Gertler (1999). We show that it is of great importance for a central bank to
consider the demographics for sound monetary policy. First, the natural rate
of interest diﬀers as the demographics change. Second, the structural shocks to
the economy have asymmetric eﬀects on heterogeneous agents, namely workers
and retirees. Diﬀerences in the labor productivity between workers and retirees
make a positive technology shock enhance the worker’s but decrease the re-
tiree’s welfare. Furthermore, due to the higher reliance on the ﬁnancial asset,
retirees become better oﬀ with a positive shock on nominal interest rates. This,
especially, implies that a central bank may face a severe policy trade-oﬀ.I f
the central bank cares more about retirees, or if monetary policy is determined
mainly through opinions of older people because of their bargaining power in
politics over younger people, there may be a bias towards higher nominal inter-
est rates. Yet, even though societal aging deepens, in aggregate, a tightening
monetary policy shock still has negative impacts on the aggregate demand since
worker’s consumption or the investment need to be lowered while consumption
of retirees increase. Finally, the demographic structure changes the dynamic
properties of the solution, namely the degree of ampliﬁcation in the impulse
responses. The less retirees work under stationary population, the less volatile
macroeconomic variables are against shocks. Under such circumstances, a posi-
tive technology shock does not increase retiree’s labor supply and so the negative
eﬀects from a positive monetary policy shock are alleviated by an increase in
retiree’s consumption.
In particular, the latter two points are very relevant to the recent econ-
omy developments in Japan, where the total population is expected to start
decreasing and baby boomers are to retire en masse around 2007. Depend-
ing on whether retirees continue to work or not, macroeconomic responses to
shocks could be dramatically changed in foreseeable future. Not only would the
eﬀectiveness of monetary policy via surprise could change but also a positive
monetary policy shock may even temporarily increase output and inﬂation.
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